{"id":5911,"date":"2011-04-11T19:17:06","date_gmt":"2011-04-11T15:17:06","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/?p=5911"},"modified":"2011-04-16T11:23:14","modified_gmt":"2011-04-16T07:23:14","slug":"problems-lurking-on-the-horizon-for-gulf-states","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/showcase\/problems-lurking-on-the-horizon-for-gulf-states\/","title":{"rendered":"Iran: Problems on the Horizon for Gulf States"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"<\/a>Born in an era when the German Mark was trading at over four trillion to the Dollar and the League of Nations still sought to regulate international alliances, Saudi Arabia\u2019s King Abdullah, who has lived through the inauguration of fifteen US Presidents, is truly a man of a different age.<\/p>\n

Given what one might \u2013 rightly or wrongly \u2013 expect from a Saudi King who is nearly a nonagenarian, steeped in the austere, conservative Wahhabi culture of Saudi Arabia, some of his policies have been relatively enlightened. For example, he founded the King Abdullah University for Science and Technology (KAUST), which is a resolutely co-educational campus where Saudi\u2019s feared mutaween<\/em> (religious police) are not allowed to go, where women can drive and are not mandated to cover their hair.<\/p>\n

A Shia Lens<\/h3>\n

Yet one sphere in which Abdullah certainly is hawkish and conservative is that of Saudi foreign policy towards Iran. Here Abdullah appears to subscribe to the notion that Iran is perennially seeking to undermine Arab societies in some way, shape or form. Unprecedented in modern times, the Saudi Arabia-led intervention in Bahrain exemplifies this logic, with Bahrain seen as the front line of a cold but warming war which must be defended against Iran at all costs.<\/p>\n

Three primary currents of fear \u2013 noted in their order of their priority to the Saudi government \u2013 drove this extreme policy.<\/p>\n

Firstly, Riyadh fears that the establishment of any kind of meaningful Shia participation in Bahrain\u2019s government \u2013 let alone a representative Shia Parliament \u2013 may allow, if not actively encourage, some kind of a militant Shia beach-head on Saudi Arabia\u2019s doorstep. The notion that a Bahraini Hezbollah could emerge, or that some units of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) could be covertly based in Bahrain, but a few kilometres from Saudi Arabia\u2019s key oil fields, is immiscible to Saudi Arabia\u2019s core security purview.<\/p>\n

Secondly, Abdullah does not want to see the installation of a Shia-led government in Bahrain at the expense of the Sunni Al Khalifah family\u2019s power. Such an upheaval could be interpreted as the first step towards the emasculation of royal power in Bahrain, and Riyadh is loath to allow such a precedent to be set.<\/p>\n

Finally, Saudi Arabia wants to avoid the establishment of any kind of strong Shia-led government so close to its own Shia population, lest contagion spreads and they too begin to demand more rights.<\/p>\n

These events take place in the context of what many in the region see to be growing Shia power, as encapsulated by the notion of a Shia crescent \u2018enveloping\u2019 the region, as suggested by Jordan\u2019s King Abdullah II in 2004. The recent expulsion of three Iranian diplomats from Kuwait convicted of spying for the IRGC [1] exacerbated tensions and further fostered notions of Shia encroachment.<\/p>\n

This Shia lens through which many people in the Gulf (certainly not just Saudi Arabia) view regional politics means that, for example, the protests in Bahrain are not seen as a disenfranchised sector of society complaining and demanding equal opportunities and fair representation, but necessarily instigated by Iran. \u2018You see the same people on the streets of Bahrain as on the streets of Iraq \u2026 these people \u2026 [are] sent by Iran to cause trouble\u2019 as one Kuwaiti put it, linking the narrative of Iran fostering sectarian strife in Iraq with Bahrain. [2]<\/p>\n

Is It Merited?<\/h3>\n

In many ways, this kind of vilification of Iran is exactly what Tehran wants. It strives to foster a reputation for itself as a mighty state with elite and highly capable armed forces, whose sole goal is to propagate the Revolution and the velayat<\/em>-e faqih<\/em> rule of law.<\/p>\n

In reality, Iran is \u2013 to a large degree \u2013 a paper tiger. Considering that it is arguably the richest state on earth in terms of oil and gas deposits, economically it is surprisingly weak with a GDP per capita of around $11,000, high unemployment and inflation. Socially, it has the world\u2019s highest rate of human capital flight (often referred to as \u2018brain-drain\u2019) and the world\u2019s highest proportion of opiate drug-users. [3] Politically, the country is riven with conflict, as evidenced by the million-strong protests after the stolen election in 2010. Militarily it is outspent five to one by the UK, and even by the comparatively tiny United Arab Emirates (UAE). Moreover, as General Petraeus recently bluntly stated \u2018The Emirati Air Force itself could take out the entire Iranian Air Force.\u2019 [4]<\/p>\n

Asymmetrically, Iran needs to be taken seriously: the Islamic movements that it spawned and still supports in the Levant are arguably as strong as they have ever been and contribute to Iran\u2019s deterrence. Also, its IRGC irregular forces have been relatively well-funded when compared with its traditional armed forces, and it would be foolish to underestimate them.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, this Iran \u2013 the Iran reliant on endless rhetorical bluster and a desperate showmanship striving to live up to several thousand years of a proud and strong civilisation whose key strengths today are, in fact, ambiguity and other asymmetries of power \u2013 bears little resemblance to the perfidious and powerful Iran as envisaged by some Gulf Arabs.<\/p>\n

A Rock And A Hard Place<\/h3>\n

Whatever the true extent of Iranian power and their actions on the Arab side of the Gulf, the simple fact is that Saudi Arabia acts as if their threat were compelling and imminent. This may have unforeseen implications for regional security.<\/p>\n

The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) met recently, and issued a joint statement in which Iran was accused of \u2018blatantly \u2026 interfering in Kuwait\u2019s affairs\u2019 and of \u2018continuous \u2026 interference in the domestic affairs of the GCC countries \u2026 and [instigating] sectarian sedition between \u2026 [GCC countries’] citizens.\u2019[5] This is unusually aggressive and inflammatory language from the GCC States and reflects the point of view of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE more than Qatar or Oman.<\/p>\n

Though Doha and Muscat may well be as uneasy about Iran\u2019s motives or actions in the Gulf as other GCC members, they deal with Tehran in a different way, taking, where possible, more conciliatory approaches. For Qatar, the fact that they share and jointly exploit the world\u2019s biggest gas field with Iran plays a key role in this decision and Qatari authorities are understandably wary of antagonising Iran.<\/p>\n

Qatar and Oman will be under pressure to tow the GCC line, as they have in this instance. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait will want a united GCC front against Iran. While these two states will follow this to some degree, it would require a full reappraisal of their foreign policy towards Iran if this trend of difficult relations between the GCC and Iran were to continue. They are thus left with some difficult decisions, which might give them no choice but to antagonise either their fellow Arab States or Iran.<\/p>\n

Notes<\/h3>\n

[1] Habin Toumi \u2018Kuwait to expel three Iranian diplomats involved in spy ring\u2019 Gulf News<\/em> 31 <\/sup>March 2011 http:\/\/gulfnews.com\/news\/gulf\/kuwait\/kuwait-to-expel-three-iranian-diplomats-involved-in-spy-ring-1.785663<\/a><\/p>\n

[2] Personal interview (March 2011)<\/p>\n

[3] For more statistics like this see \u2018Iran is a Paper Tiger\u2019, Intelligence Squared Debate<\/em>, <\/em>24 February 2011<\/p>\n

[4] Josh Rogin, \u2018Petraeus: The U.A.E\u2019s Air Force could take out Iran\u2019s’, Foreign Policy<\/em>, <\/em>17 December 2009 <<\/em>http:\/\/thecable.foreignpolicy.com\/posts\/2009\/12\/17\/petraeus_the_uaes_air_force_could_take_out_irans<\/a>><\/p>\n

[5] GCC states condemn Iran\u2019s blatant interference in Kuwait\u2019s affairs, Kuwait Times<\/em>, 5 April 2011 \u00a0<http:\/\/www.kuwaittimes.net\/read_news.php?newsid=MTI3NDY1Njg5MQ<\/a>><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

DAVID ROBERTS: These events take place in the context of growing Shia power, encapsulated by the notion of a Shia crescent \u2018enveloping\u2019 the region…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":44,"featured_media":5932,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[56,82],"tags":[2224,4332,18303,5876,1060,6014,5971,103,2734,18306,5126,18321,2825,18305,6003,18315,6002,6006,18341,1182,1756,18338,18307,1031,18275,385,548,4479,2744,18316,162,18337],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5911"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/44"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=5911"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/5911\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/5932"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=5911"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=5911"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=5911"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}