{"id":30103,"date":"2013-10-17T16:31:59","date_gmt":"2013-10-17T12:31:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/?p=30103"},"modified":"2013-10-17T16:32:00","modified_gmt":"2013-10-17T12:32:00","slug":"cutting-egypts-military-aid-washingtons-dangerous-game","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/middle-east-politics-analysis\/cutting-egypts-military-aid-washingtons-dangerous-game\/","title":{"rendered":"Cutting Egypt’s Military Aid: Washington’s Dangerous Game"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"military<\/a><\/p>\n

The decision by the Obama administration to freeze military aid deprives the\u00a0Egyptian military of its favourite toys but does little to weaken its military capability.\u00a0It further strains relations with key US allies in the Gulf, and highlights Washington\u2019s\u00a0difficulty in balancing its twin goals of stability and democratisation in the Middle\u00a0East and North Africa.<\/p>\n

Commentary<\/b><\/p>\n

THE OBAMA administration\u2019s decision to impose sanctions on Egypt\u2019s military-\u00a0appointed government following the killing of 51 anti-military protestors in Egypt\u00a0illustrates the US\u2019 limited leverage on one of its closest allies in the Middle East and\u00a0North Africa. It also reflects its difficulty in striking a balance between acknowledging\u00a0that the region has entered into an era of messy transition and maintaining close ties\u00a0to its counter-revolutionary allies such as Saudi Arabia.<\/p>\n

Washington had refrained in the past three months to define as a coup the military\u2019s\u00a0overthrow of Egypt\u2019s only democratically-elected president and brutal suppression of\u00a0the Muslim Brotherhood that left more than 1,000 people dead, to avoid being legally\u00a0obliged to cut off aid.<\/p>\n

Reinforcing worries about US stance<\/b><\/p>\n

The aid freeze comes on the heels of the announcement of a November date for the\u00a0start of court proceedings against ousted president Mohamed Morsi. It is likely to\u00a0reinforce Saudi and Israeli fears that Washington is steering a dangerous course not\u00a0only by its perceived support for fundamental change of the region\u2019s established order\u00a0but also by its willingness to engage with revolutionary Iran, seen by Arab conservative\u00a0as a threat to their national security.<\/p>\n

In anticipation of the US sanctions, Egyptian interim President Adly Mansour secured\u00a0pledges for continued support from Saudi Arabia and other cash-rich Gulf states that\u00a0have already funded his government to the tune of US$12 billion. In advance of the coup\u00a0against Morsi, Saudi Arabia had already assured the Egyptian military that it would\u00a0compensate for any loss of US economic and financial aid.<\/p>\n

The Gulf\u2019s support has kept the post-Morsi government afloat but does little to address\u00a0Egypt\u2019s festering, structural economic problems nor does it offer the prospect of\u00a0substituting military hardware for what is the world\u2019s 14th largest\u00a0 armed forces.<\/p>\n

Little impact<\/b><\/p>\n

For now, that is unlikely to matter much. The Egyptian military, battling a rising\u00a0insurgency in the Sinai, like its Gulf allies has little interest in tinkering with Egypt\u2019s\u00a01979 peace treaty with Israel – in retaliation for the sanctions. In longer economic terms\u00a0however, Gulf cash makes Egypt less inclined to embrace painful economic reforms that\u00a0can put the country on a sustainable path of economic growth and ensure a more\u00a0equitable economic development that benefits the population at large rather than a\u00a0minority. In military terms, Egypt, with some 4,000 tanks and 240 F-16 jets and a budget\u00a0of $4.21 billion in 2012, is hardly in dire need of additional hardware.<\/p>\n

Rather US military aid served to feed the Egyptian armed forces\u2019 appetite for\u00a0sophisticated American hardware, secure jobs in its military industrial complex and\u00a0guarantee hundreds of millions of dollars in business for American defence contractors.\u00a0Ironically, US military aid also reinforced the military\u2019s position as a force beyond the\u00a0control of the government – a fact that has come to haunt the country in its now stalled\u00a0effort to escape autocracy and move towards a more liberal society.<\/p>\n

The expansion of the state-owned productive sector enabled the military to gain access\u00a0to raw materials that had been intended for the manufacturing of subsidised goods for\u00a0the poorer, lower ranks of society. US aid that kicked in after Egypt\u2019s peace treaty with\u00a0Israel primarily opened up business opportunities for serving and retired officers, who\u00a0consequently were often focused on their economic rather than military interests.<\/p>\n

A secretive monopoly<\/b><\/p>\n

The military\u2019s secretive commercial empire and monopoly in certain sectors expanded\u00a0from defence manufacturing into consumer products such as washing machines,\u00a0refrigerators and televisions, tourism facilities, soccer pitches, agriculture, livestock,\u00a0butane gas, slaughterhouses and metal sheeting for construction projects as well as\u00a0services and land reclamation projects.<\/p>\n

Often poorly managed and commercially inefficient, military-owned companies\u00a0dominate the markets for water, olive oil, cement, construction, hotels and gasoline.\u00a0They account for anywhere between eight and 45 percent of the country\u2019s gross\u00a0domestic product. The ministry, which has 40,000 civilian employees, earns an\u00a0estimated US$345 million in annual revenues.<\/p>\n

The military\u2019s economic empire has allowed it to fund the government when necessary\u00a0to achieve its political goals. It injected US$1 billion in 2012 into the central bank to\u00a0ease the country\u2019s cash shortage at a time that the military was in government in thefirst 18 months after the toppling of President Hosni Mubarak by a popular revolt.\u00a0Food riots in 2008 prompted military bakeries to distribute bread.<\/p>\n

The move reflected the military\u2019s ability to supply at a low cost basic goods that were\u00a0becoming increasingly expensive as a result of economic liberalisation including the\u00a0floating of the Egyptian pound. \u201cThis is why the army is investing in other businesses,\u00a0such as foodstuff and garments, to generate income,\u201d assistant defence minister Major\u00a0General Mahmoud Nasr said last year.<\/p>\n

Any suggestion that the cut-off of US military aid could push the military to finally\u00a0embrace economic reform is made moot\u00a0 by the influx of Gulf cash. It is unlikely to be\u00a0persuaded of the need to create a more level playing field, abolish its ability to dictate\u00a0to Egypt\u2019s business elite what commercial activities they can and cannot develop,\u00a0shrink its commercially inefficient empire, and endorse privatisation.<\/p>\n

It nonetheless signals limits to US willingness to endorse autocratic rule that fails to\u00a0uphold some measure of respect for human rights and more equitable economic\u00a0development.\u00a0The decision by the Obama administration to freeze military aid deprives the\u00a0Egyptian military of its favourite toys but does little to weaken its military capability.\u00a0It further strains relations with key US allies in the Gulf, and highlights Washington\u2019s\u00a0difficulty in balancing its twin goals of stability and democratisation in the Middle\u00a0East and North Africa.<\/p>\n

Commentary<\/b><\/p>\n

THE OBAMA administration\u2019s decision to impose sanctions on Egypt\u2019s military-\u00a0appointed government following the killing of 51 anti-military protestors in Egypt\u00a0illustrates the US\u2019 limited leverage on one of its closest allies in the Middle East and\u00a0North Africa. It also reflects its difficulty in striking a balance between acknowledging\u00a0that the region has entered into an era of messy transition and maintaining close ties\u00a0to its counter-revolutionary allies such as Saudi Arabia.<\/p>\n

Washington had refrained in the past three months to define as a coup the military\u2019s\u00a0overthrow of Egypt\u2019s only democratically-elected president and brutal suppression o\u00a0the Muslim Brotherhood that left more than 1,000 people dead, to avoid being legally\u00a0obliged to cut off aid.<\/p>\n

Reinforcing worries about US stance<\/b><\/p>\n

The aid freeze comes on the heels of the announcement of a November date for the\u00a0start of court proceedings against ousted president Mohamed Morsi. It is likely to\u00a0reinforce Saudi and Israeli fears that Washington is steering a dangerous course not\u00a0only by its perceived support for fundamental change of the region\u2019s established order\u00a0but also by its willingness to engage with revolutionary Iran, seen by Arab conservatives\u00a0as a threat to their national security.<\/p>\n

In anticipation of the US sanctions, Egyptian interim President Adly Mansour secured\u00a0pledges for continued support from Saudi Arabia and other cash-rich Gulf states that\u00a0have already funded his government to the tune of US$12 billion. In advance of the coup\u00a0against Morsi, Saudi Arabia had already assured the Egyptian military that it would\u00a0compensate for any loss of US economic and financial aid.<\/p>\n

The Gulf\u2019s support has kept the post-Morsi government afloat but does little to address\u00a0Egypt\u2019s festering, structural economic problems nor does it offer the prospect of\u00a0substituting military hardware for what is the world\u2019s 14th largest\u00a0 armed forces.<\/p>\n

Little impact<\/b><\/p>\n

For now, that is unlikely to matter much. The Egyptian military, battling a rising\u00a0insurgency in the Sinai, like its Gulf allies has little interest in tinkering with Egypt\u2019s\u00a01979 peace treaty with Israel – in retaliation for the sanctions. In longer economic terms\u00a0however, Gulf cash makes Egypt less inclined to embrace painful economic reforms that\u00a0can put the country on a sustainable path of economic growth and ensure a more\u00a0equitable economic development that benefits the population at large rather than a\u00a0minority. In military terms, Egypt, with some 4,000 tanks and 240 F-16 jets and a budget\u00a0of $4.21 billion in 2012, is hardly in dire need of additional hardware.<\/p>\n

Rather US military aid served to feed the Egyptian armed forces\u2019 appetite for\u00a0sophisticated American hardware, secure jobs in its military industrial complex and\u00a0guarantee hundreds of millions of dollars in business for American defence contractors.\u00a0Ironically, US military aid also reinforced the military\u2019s position as a force beyond the\u00a0control of the government – a fact that has come to haunt the country in its now stalled\u00a0effort to escape autocracy and move towards a more liberal society.<\/p>\n

The expansion of the state-owned productive sector enabled the military to gain access\u00a0to raw materials that had been intended for the manufacturing of subsidised goods for\u00a0the poorer, lower ranks of society. US aid that kicked in after Egypt\u2019s peace treaty with\u00a0Israel primarily opened up business opportunities for serving and retired officers, who\u00a0consequently were often focused on their economic rather than military interests.<\/p>\n

A secretive monopoly<\/b><\/p>\n

The military\u2019s secretive commercial empire and monopoly in certain sectors expanded\u00a0from defence manufacturing into consumer products such as washing machines,\u00a0refrigerators and televisions, tourism facilities, soccer pitches, agriculture, livestock,\u00a0butane gas, slaughterhouses and metal sheeting for construction projects as well as\u00a0services and land reclamation projects.<\/p>\n

Often poorly managed and commercially inefficient, military-owned companies\u00a0dominate the markets for water, olive oil, cement, construction, hotels and gasoline.\u00a0They account for anywhere between eight and 45 percent of the country\u2019s gross\u00a0domestic product. The ministry, which has 40,000 civilian employees, earns an\u00a0estimated US$345 million in annual revenues.<\/p>\n

The military\u2019s economic empire has allowed it to fund the government when necessary\u00a0to achieve its political goals. It injected US$1 billion in 2012 into the central bank to\u00a0ease the country\u2019s cash shortage at a time that the military was in government in the\u00a0first 18 months after the toppling of President Hosni Mubarak by a popular revolt.\u00a0Food riots in 2008 prompted military bakeries to distribute bread.<\/p>\n

The move reflected the military\u2019s ability to supply at a low cost basic goods that were\u00a0becoming increasingly expensive as a result of economic liberalisation including the\u00a0floating of the Egyptian pound. \u201cThis is why the army is investing in other businesses,\u00a0such as foodstuff and garments, to generate income,\u201d assistant defence minister Major\u00a0General Mahmoud Nasr said last year.<\/p>\n

Any suggestion that the cut-off of US military aid could push the military to finally\u00a0embrace economic reform is made moot\u00a0 by the influx of Gulf cash. It is unlikely to be\u00a0persuaded of the need to create a more level playing field, abolish its ability to dictate\u00a0to Egypt\u2019s business elite what commercial activities they can and cannot develop,\u00a0shrink its commercially inefficient empire, and endorse privatisation.<\/p>\n

It nonetheless signals limits to US willingness to endorse autocratic rule that fails to\u00a0uphold some measure of respect for human rights and more equitable economic\u00a0development.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

JAMES M. DORSEY: It’s clear that Washington has embarked on a major re-alignment of its strategic resources in the Middle East. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":32,"featured_media":30105,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[154,124,82,235,60,482],"tags":[17890,16484,1209,2399,18300,17889,969,2323,16615,18306,18311,17233,16920,16773,191,16774,17548,389,18324,2317,18286,18275,1566,18302,16614,2020,16497],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30103"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/32"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=30103"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30103\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":30114,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30103\/revisions\/30114"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/30105"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=30103"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=30103"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=30103"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}