{"id":27551,"date":"2013-04-07T09:16:35","date_gmt":"2013-04-07T05:16:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/?p=27551"},"modified":"2013-04-18T13:36:25","modified_gmt":"2013-04-18T09:36:25","slug":"known-unknowns-applying-the-rumsfeld-test-to-kingdom","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/region\/gcc\/saudi-arabia\/known-unknowns-applying-the-rumsfeld-test-to-kingdom\/","title":{"rendered":"Applying ‘The Rumsfeld Test’ on the Kingdom"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Pentagon<\/a><\/p>\n

In 2003 Donald Rumsfeld, the former US Defence Secretary, uttered his now infamous speech about what\u00a0was\u00a0and was\u00a0not\u00a0known about the link between Iraq and supplying terrorist groups with weapons of mass destruction.<\/p>\n

\u201cthere are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns \u2013 the ones we don\u2019t know we don\u2019t know.\u201d<\/p>\n

While the language is deeply contorted, Rumsfeld\u2019s tripartite system of segmenting classes of information is not an unreasonable rubric to use when assessing an issue. Given the latest intrigues in the elite of Saudi Arabia that had analysts scrambling to engage in the Arab version of Sovietology to explain a completely unexpected move, the application of any logical rubric to this most convoluted of issues is welcome to ascertain exactly what we know we know.<\/p>\n

The known knowns<\/b><\/p>\n

On 1st February 2013 Prince Muqrin Bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud was appointed Second Deputy Prime Minister in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This appointment shocked Saudi watchers as the received wisdom suggested that Muqrin would be ineligible because of his Yemeni lineage on his mother\u2019s side. While Muqrin becoming Crown Prince and King is now a likely outcome, the fact that few expected him to be there in the first place acts as a prompt to revisit some of these known knowns.<\/p>\n

The position of Second Deputy Prime Minister is important and has signalled \u2018Crown Prince in waiting\u2019 in recent transitions even if it has been unfilled at times, notably from August 2005 to March 2009. Nevertheless, Muqrin\u2019s continued ascent is not certain. The 1992 \u2018Basic Law of Governance\u2019 and the 2006 \u2018Allegiance Council\u2019 are both mechanisms that endow, respectively, the King and the Crown Prince in conjunction with leading Princes the power to amend those in line to the throne.<\/p>\n

While one may expect Murqin \u2013 a relatively spry\u00a0sexagenarian<\/a>\u00a0or\u00a0septuagenarian<\/a>\u00a0(the ages of Saudi Royalty belonging in the \u2018known unknown\u2019 category) \u2013 to rise to the office of King relatively soon particularly given the age and increasing infirmity of the King and the Crown Prince, this too is far from certain. King Fahd (r.1982-2005) was incapacitated for most of the last decade of his rule, yet neither he nor his supporters thought it better for him to step aside. In Kuwait complete physical and mental incapacity did not forestall Saad ascending to the office of Emir in 2006. In that instance it was Kuwait\u2019s vocal and uncontrollable Parliament that forced him to resign after only nine days \u2018in power.\u2019 Bar typical intra-family squabbling, Saudi Arabia has no equivalent that could push through such a measure were it needed.<\/p>\n

It is also implicitly assumed that Muqrin\u2019s promotion means that Saudi Arabia\u2019s rulers will now have to move to the next generation. Since the founding of the modern state of Saudi Arabia by Ibn Saud in 1932, rule has passed directly to one of his sons. King Abdullah, the current incumbent, became King when he was in his eighties, while two of his Crown Princes (Sultan and Nayef) have already died while Crown Prince Salman is believed to be largely infirm and in his late seventies.<\/p>\n

Given that Murqin is the youngest son of Ibn Saud this means that several of his older brothers have been passed over in his favour. In Saudi Arabia where there is a premium placed on age seniority, this suggests that they have run out of suitable sons of Ibn Saud and a generational shift is imminent. While this is, again, logical if not likely, it must not be forgotten that should Salman or Murqin become King they can install whomever they choose, as long as they can corral support for the decision.<\/p>\n

Known unknowns<\/b><\/p>\n

While the generational jump to Ibn Saud\u2019s grandchildren could be postponed the eventual shift is the central known unknown of Saudi politics.<\/p>\n

Muhammad Bin Nayef, the son of the former influential Minister of Interior and Crown Prince, leads speculation after becoming the first of the second generation to oversee a principal Ministry when he took over from his uncle Prince Ahmed as Minister of the Interior in November 2012. Believed to be highly capable in his former role in Counter Terrorism at the Ministry with an impeccable lineage and enough influence already to meet officially with President Obama in January 2013, he was a strong candidate for the post of Second Deputy Prime Minister and remains prominent.<\/p>\n

However, things are not always what they seem in Riyadh. Many assumed that Muqrin\u2019s abrupt removal as head of intelligence in July 2012, coming in the wake of increasing public criticism, was a sign of him\u00a0losing<\/a>\u00a0power. Instead this move was a precursor to assuming the position of second in line to the throne.<\/p>\n

Instead of sifting through the minutiae of each candidate\u2019s CV and family linkages or investing too heavily in court gossip, it is more fruitful to seek a set of guidelines and factors that will inform the decision-making.<\/p>\n

Firstly, there are traditional factors to consider. He must be a grandson of Ibn Saud and while age seniority is important, as Muqrin\u2019s ascension and Muhammad Bin Nayef\u2019s replacement of his uncle at the Ministry of the Interior showed, it is clearly not a defining concern. Of greater importance is a demonstrable track record of effective leadership in an august Ministry or an important region. The challenges facing Saudi Arabia are legion and a would-be ruler from the next generation will have to prove that he has the pedigree and the aptitude to work effectively.<\/p>\n

Though senior Princes confirm a putative Crown Prince, they have to take into account an element of popular support. Similarly, given the inequalities in the Kingdom and the place that corruption is widely believed to have had as lending impetus to the Arab Spring, a relatively uncorrupted reputation would be an advantage.<\/p>\n

Any candidate who can carefully craft such an image will reap significant gains given the importance of presenting a positive public face. The use of the press by much of the elite in Saudi Arabia is barely one step up from Path\u00e9\u00a0news. Bland press releases with little actual news but with plenty of references to the religious formalities conducted before, during, and after each meeting are adorned with pictures of King Abdullah or other leading Royals with unfeasibly black beards and moustaches. Given the increasingly media savvy Saudi citizens, as shown in a recent\u00a0survey<\/a>\u00a0that found Riyadh to be the 10th most active city in the world on Twitter, such anachronistic media handling is all the more jarring.<\/p>\n

The fact that Muqrin has no\u00a0recorded<\/a>\u00a0full-brothers or sons with top-level experience suggests that he may be a relatively impartial arbiter. His well documented closeness to King Abdullah hints that he would look to an effective, technocratic successor as opposed to being concerned with austere religious credentials. But most of all he will look for the consensus candidate; someone that can command authority quickly in a Kingdom that strives for stability above all else.<\/p>\n

Unknown unknowns<\/b><\/p>\n

An unknown unknown is unknown but one can posit from where critical, game-changing concerns may arise.<\/p>\n

An Arab Spring redux may strike Saudi Arabia. The economic dynamics and disparities in the Kingdom are acute. The Saudi \u2018Arab Spring Budget\u2019 designed to counter nascent protests with a flood of new jobs, pay increases, and house-construction projects worked but fundamental issues remain. Another incident such as the 2009 Jeddah floods which diverted attention to gross corruption and mismanagement could ignite latent anger. Equally, the continued implosion of Bahrain or Kuwait\u2019s Parliamentary wrangles escalating to wide-spread civil unrest could instigate troubles, particularly in Saudi\u2019s combustible Eastern Province where Shia-based unrest continues.<\/p>\n

Given the ill health of King Abdullah, Crown Prince Salman, and the relatively advanced years of Muqrin, a series of quick successions is not out of the question. Any number of permutations could force the new elite to arrive at hastily contrived arrangements. With the potential of a grandson of Ibn Saud sitting on the throne for multiple decades with the corollary that other members of his generation lose their opportunity at attaining the top job, there is ample reason for those overlooked to agitate in the wings for a better spot.<\/p>\n

While the future of Saudi Arabia could be an unknown unknown with untold effects from existing or future challenges destabilising the Kingdom, Saudis have heard such pronouncements on a regular basis for decades. Yet the Kingdom prevailed. There may not be anyone in the near future who could match the figure of King Abdullah who has overseen nearly two decades of tumultuous Saudi history and commands widespread respect for his slow modernising moves. But elite interests, while factional and facing new internal issues, are all predicated on maintaining their exclusive grip on power; a deeply motivating and unifying concept.<\/p>\n

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DAVID ROBERTS: Reading the runes of Saudi Arabia’s possible succession is an art, a science and a mystery wrapped in one. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":44,"featured_media":27552,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[173,83,60,482,10],"tags":[2224,16998,2677,1981,16615,13378,16999,16997,18315,191,17002,17001,17000,16570,17003,18275,13365],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27551"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/44"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=27551"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27551\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":27973,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27551\/revisions\/27973"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/27552"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=27551"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=27551"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=27551"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}