{"id":11368,"date":"2011-10-09T15:05:52","date_gmt":"2011-10-09T11:05:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/?p=11368"},"modified":"2011-10-11T07:22:26","modified_gmt":"2011-10-11T03:22:26","slug":"big-claims-by-wsj-on-iranbahrain-but-proof","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/middle-east-politics-analysis\/big-claims-by-wsj-on-iranbahrain-but-proof\/","title":{"rendered":"Big Claims By ‘WSJ’ on Iran & Bahrain. But Proof?"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"<\/a>I have written on numerous occasions about Iran and Bahrain (here <\/a>here<\/a> and here<\/a>). I am neither Bahraini nor Iranian. Nor do I have a gripe with either side. Nor am I a dyed in the wool conservative or a pinko liberal. I try to come at the issue of the Shia in Bahrain, the stalled pearl \u2018revolution\u2019 and the question of Iran\u2019s involvement therein as neutrally as possible. I try to caveat what I say and have frequently noted my openness to listen to and evaluate new evidence.<\/p>\n

Thus far it is my conclusion that Iran has not played a significant role in the uprisings in Bahrain. There is quite simply not the evidence in the public domain to support such a statement. Which is why I was so interested in this article <\/a>published in the Wall Street Journal. I was looking forward to reading some critical scholarship or analysis that eschews the tired and typical generalities of nasty Iran.<\/p>\n

Alas I was disappointed.<\/p>\n

The following is the entire article with my comments underneath. As per my blog\u2019s style, I have commented in a dry and sometimes sarcastic manner. This is not to be mean or disrespectful, but, frankly, it\u2019s a disgraceful article that deserves all the derision it gets.<\/p>\n

\u2026<\/p>\n

When the history of the 2011 Arab uprisings is written, Bahrain\u2019s chapter will likely be the most unexpected for a casual reader. Though military rule was lifted in June and widespread public protests have not been seen since March, Bahrain\u2019s place in the region\u2019s upheavals remains deeply misunderstood.<\/em><\/p>\n

So far, so intriguing. I\u2019d agree to some degree; all of us are operating from behind some kind of veil of ignorance; we don\u2019t know the inner workings of the Bahraini MOI or the King\u2019s mind, so what we do is draw educated assumptions and suggest sensible explanations.<\/p>\n

Bahrain is not just another falling domino in the Arab Spring. Nor is it experiencing a surge of spontaneous resistance by its people against their rulers.<\/em><\/p>\n

There\u2019s no spontaneity to it? At all. None? Not even a bit? Not a tiny bit? A teensy tiny bit? That is a HUGE<\/strong> deceleration to make.<\/p>\n

Rather, Bahrain is the victim of a long cycle of intrigue and interference aimed at replacing the moderate and modernizing Khalifa regime with a theocracy under Tehran\u2019s thumb.<\/em><\/p>\n

And these two things are mutually exclusive? I\u2019d beg to differ.<\/p>\n

This spring, as protesters camped out in Manama\u2019s Pearl Square by night and hurled stones by day, Iran mobilized its public-relations teams, which read scripted newscasts denouncing the Khalifa family.<\/em><\/p>\n

Aaah! The dreaded media wing of the evil Republic! Run for the hills! Not\u2026.PR!<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, Tehran\u2019s military drafted intervention plans.<\/em><\/p>\n

Yer what!!?? Proof please.<\/p>\n

Though even if one assumes that such plans have been made \u2013 which I can well imagine and have no problem admitting (I\u2019m well aware that Iran is extremely far from a benign actor: see Kuwait earlier <\/a>this year) \u2013 I\u2019d personally have thought that they\u2019d have been there for ages. Not, as he directly insinuates<\/strong>, having being conjured up post-Spring.<\/p>\n

Western observers and governments took the bait and shied away from addressing the true origins of the violence, instead urging Bahrain to show restraint.<\/em><\/p>\n

Mmm\u2026because Western states like, oh I don\u2019t know\u2026America\u2026so love to play down<\/strong> the Iranian threat\u2026RI-diculous<\/p>\n

The misreading was doubly disappointing given Tehran\u2019s long history of working to upset Bahrain\u2019s domestic stability. Since Iran\u2019s 1979 revolution, the country\u2019s leaders have assumed that their revolution represents the aspirations of Shiites throughout the Mideast.<\/em><\/p>\n

Okay<\/p>\n

That is why they have worked to undermine the Sunni Khalifa family\u2019s legitimacy in Bahrain by promoting an ideology of Shiite empowerment.<\/em><\/p>\n

Fair enough<\/p>\n

When Nateq Nuri, advisor to Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, claimed Bahrain as Iran\u2019s \u201c14th province\u201d in 2009, he was only restating well-worn rhetoric from the revolution 30 years prior.<\/em><\/p>\n

Indeed<\/p>\n

Today there is an intimidating imbalance of power between Iran and Bahrain.<\/em><\/p>\n

Umm\u2026anyone know of any fleets based in Bahrain? Anyone?? Venture a guess??? Could have sworn I saw a LOT of big grey ships last time I was there.<\/p>\n

Iran\u2019s standing military numbers 510,000\u2014roughly two-thirds of Bahrain\u2019s entire population. Bahrain would have little to worry about if Iran were content merely to grandstand and make threatening noises. But Tehran has taken concrete steps over the last 30 years to destabilize and de-legitimize Bahrain\u2019s leadership, both directly and through proxies.<\/em><\/p>\n

\u2026<\/p>\n

Iranian subversion began in December 1981, when the Tehran-based Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB) attempted a high-profile coup. An Iranian-trained team of Shiite Bahrainis were to simultaneously attack telecommunications services and Bahrain\u2019s airport, and would assassinate key members of the Khalifa regime. In the ensuing chaos, Iran would send in its military and establish a new theocratic regime similar to its own.<\/em><\/p>\n

I\u2019ve never come across any proof of this, but am willing to believe it\u2026no-one is trying to say that Iran is a cuddly neighbour<\/p>\n

The coup failed, but the experience spurred the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which today includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Under the December 1981 Saudi-Bahrain Security Pact, Saudi Arabia placed its entire \u201cpotential in the service of Bahrain\u2019s security.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n

How chivalrous<\/p>\n

That didn\u2019t stop Iran from working to extend its power. But in the late 1980s, Iran overplayed its hand when it started mining sea lanes in an attempt to control the Persian Gulf. Four days after a U.S. frigate struck an Iranian mine in 1988, the U.S. launched Operation Praying Mantis to sweep Iran\u2019s naval presence from both sides of the Gulf.<\/em><\/p>\n

Having been checked militarily by the U.S., Iran began to deploy more clandestine methods in its quest for regional control. When unemployed Bahrainis rallied at their government\u2019s labor ministry in 1994, Iran filled the country<\/em><\/p>\n

Hyperbole\u2026much?<\/p>\n

With propaganda advocating a Shiite intifada characterized by \u201cdemocracy\u201d and \u201cequality.\u201d Tehran even offered to mediate as the \u201cDays of Rage\u201d grew in ferocity and Bahrainis faced daily acts of violence in the unrest, which lasted until 1999.<\/em><\/p>\n

Mounting evidence of Iran\u2019s duplicity prompted the U.S. to permanently station its Fifth Fleet in Manama in 1995. Taking the move as a provocation, Tehran intensified its intifada<\/em><\/p>\n

Curious phraseology<\/p>\n

and began training Bahraini Shiite fighters in Iran.<\/em><\/p>\n

Proof? But again, I\u2019m willing to suspect that some folks were indeed so trained. (My only point being that this is not rock-solidly \u2018true\u2019)<\/p>\n

Among other efforts, Tehran established a military wing for Hezbollah in Bahrain, which attempted another coup in June 1996. Bahraini authorities thwarted the plot only by preemptively arresting dozens of suspects, and the kingdom continued to operate under de-facto martial law that didn\u2019t end until 1999, when Sheik Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa died and his son and successor took over the kingdom.<\/em><\/p>\n

The new King Hamed bin Issa Al Khalifa promptly ordered an end to emergency rule, instituted a general amnesty for political prisoners and reestablished Bahrain\u2019s popularly elected Shura Council. But while many hoped that Hamed\u2019s gestures would ease Bahrain\u2019s religious tensions, the liberalizations only saw the Shiite community become more militant.<\/em><\/p>\n

\u2026and they had no grievances about which to agitate?<\/p>\n

The current uprising, or so-called Pearl Revolution, in fact did not begin this year but dates back to 2008, when Bahraini authorities arrested senior Shiite clerics accused of conspiring against the government. The sporadic violence that ensued culminated in still another attempted coup. Then in December 2008, 14 people were arrested on suspicion of planning a series of terror attacks against commercial centers, diplomatic missions and night clubs in Bahrain.<\/em><\/p>\n

Proof?<\/p>\n

The arrests unleashed still more violence. It was against this backdrop that Iran\u2019s Mr. Nuri called Bahrain Iran\u2019s \u201c14th province,\u201d a statement greeted by joyous chants of agreement from Bahrain\u2019s Shiites.<\/em><\/p>\n

All of them? Every last one? All chanting in unison? Were you counting? How are you judging whether a chant is joyous or not? Or merely merry? How about elated or just loud? And what exactly does this mean? What level of support does this denote?<\/p>\n

Despite such revanchism, in the spring of 2009 Hamid declared another amnesty,<\/em><\/p>\n

What a guy.<\/p>\n

…this time pardoning some 170 prisoners who had been charged with endangering national security, including 35 Shias on trial for allegedly trying to overthrow the government. Normally, this would provide space for reconciliation. But again, Iran\u2019s efforts to push Bahrain into full-scale civil war have kept tensions hot.<\/em><\/p>\n

***<\/strong><\/p>\n

Thirty years of intransigence<\/em><\/p>\n

An interesting word choice. One with which I\u2019d agree. But \u2018intransigence\u2019 is not exactly explicit, direct and persistent interference, now is it?<\/p>\n

…reveal the extent of Tehran\u2019s determination to turn Bahrain into an Iranian satellite.<\/em><\/p>\n

Of course Tehran would love to have Bahrain under its fold. I don\u2019t disagree.<\/p>\n

So Iran\u2019s machinations during this year\u2019s protests should have had the international community rushing to support Bahrain, not ostracize it.<\/em><\/p>\n

Aaah\u2026the crux. The key bit. The core. The proof. The evidence. The schizzle. The skinny\u2026what machinations<\/strong>? What? Specifically? Literally? Explicitly explain what machinations you\u2019re talking about. Using real evidence, what<\/strong> have been Iran\u2019s machinations? This is T H E\u00a0 key question. One which has not even been remotely touched upon in this article.<\/p>\n

Instead, too many decision makers were still lost in the rhetoric of the wider Arab Spring. The specifics of each country are whitewashed in favor of one simplistic mantra: that the Arab peoples have been oppressed by their leaders and want democratic reform.<\/em><\/p>\n

Most have\u2026most do.<\/p>\n

This is only partially correct in some cases and fundamentally erroneous in Bahrain.<\/em><\/p>\n

So you are explicitly saying that there has been no oppression by Bahrain\u2019s elite on the Shia? This is factually what this paragraphs says. This is a bold, bold claim and one that ignores a wee mountain of evidence<\/p>\n

Instead of simply reading demonstrator\u2019s placards, leaders need to understand the country\u2019s history. Bahrain is in the midst of an existential struggle against a vastly superior foe. Meanwhile, in Iran, the international community is content to listen to calls for moderate reforms coming from immoderate ayatollahs.<\/em><\/p>\n

Nice word play at the end.<\/p>\n

\u2026<\/p>\n

All in all this is a shockingly bad article. For several reasons<\/p>\n

Agency<\/strong><\/p>\n

Are the Shia in Iran incapable of doing anything themselves? Are they unable to resist the lure \u2013 the moth to the flame \u2013 of Iran\u2019s calls? Are there no issues with Bahrain\u2019s Shia looking to a significant degree to Najaf and Karbala?<\/p>\n

While some may look to Iran as the leading\/only Shia state to some degree, what does this mean? That they support the Iranian football team? Prefer Persian food? Will martyr themselves for Ahmadinejad? Or\u2026well\u2026nothing at all. My point is not that all Shia do not take orders from Iran; surely some do but what is equally sure is some do not.<\/p>\n

And here I\u2019d look to the instructive example of the Iran Iraq war. Shia versus Shia in brutal trench warfare replete with chemical weapon attacks. By this kind of absurd narrative one would expect the Iraqi Shia to down tools and join their Shia brethren in Iran; after all Khomeini was in his revolutionary pomp. Yet did this happen? Not at all. They killed each other by the hundreds of thousands.<\/p>\n

While Iraq is obviously vastly different from Bahrain, this example is just to show that this dialectic is vastly more complex than Iran clicks its fingers and the Bahraini Shia jump. Which is exactly the kind of simplistic assumption that underpins all such ridiculous articles.<\/p>\n

Facts on the ground<\/strong><\/p>\n

I think the author needs to do a bit of wider reading regarding the Shia situation in Bahrain, particularly regarding socio-economic disenfranchisement.<\/p>\n

Proof<\/strong><\/p>\n

I realise that at times we (us outside of governments) do not have access to grade A proof, should such a thing exist. But when one is making such accusations as in this piece, it is incumbent, at the very least, for the author to be specific.<\/p>\n

I wholly agree that \u2013 or rather, as far as I know \u2013 Iran has a sporadically nefarious history with Bahrain. And that this fact should inform \u2013 but not cloud \u2013 our assumptions and research subsequently.<\/p>\n

But when beginning discussing the Pearl Revolutions and Iran\u2019s role therein, we need to be honest and note that \u2013 thus far? \u2013 there is simply no evidence of Iran\u2019s involvement. Printed stories in Iran just do not count as anything more meaningful than a bunch of printed stories. Is that it? Is that the proof of Iran\u2019s involvement: journalist witterings?<\/p>\n

I\u2019m not trying to be obtuse; I understand that Iran have a vested interest in upsetting the status quo in Bahrain and have, it seems, a history in this; but this is a serious accusation, and \u2018form\u2019 or, to put it another way, circumstantial evidence, just will not do.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

DAVID ROBERTS: The Wall Street Journal has published a very curious piece indeed on the relationship between Iran and Bahrain. It’s long on allegation but very short on proof. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":44,"featured_media":11369,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[136,154,173,82,60,482],"tags":[4008,423,18303,18278,1115,2734,18306,18321,100,1879,18315,2756,5897,4362,191,18338,217,18307,18275,4647,2744,3715,162,18302],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11368"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/44"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11368"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11368\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/11369"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11368"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11368"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mideastposts.com\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11368"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}